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In this paper, we test the hypothesis that access to electronic payments may reduce crime. 
Our results suggest that there is a negative and significant statistical relationship between 
access to electronic payments and the incidence of economic crimes such as robbery and 
burglary, while electronic transactions do little to reduce the incidence of non-economic 
crimes such as homicide and rape.  This paper provides evidence that policies and 
technologies that enable the proliferation of cashless transactions have the desired impact 
of deterring crime.   
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The Impact of Electronic Financial Payments on Crime 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past few years, several US government agencies have implemented 
programs designed to increase the use of electronic financial transactions in developing 
countries in order to reduce crime.  In this paper, we estimate the impact of electronic 
financial transactions on economic crimes in a sample of 71 countries.  Using data on 
point of sale devices and crime rates from 2004-2009, we find that an increase in point of 
sale devices of 1 per 1000 people leads to reduction in robbery of 2.2-5.6%.1  Our 
findings suggest that, while no panacea for the physical insecurity that plagues poor or 
war-torn countries, proliferation of electronic financial transactions does indeed enhance 
public safety and that American efforts to promote electronic financial transactions 
overseas are well justified.2 
The first American attempt to promote electronic financial transactions as a 
means of enhancing security was a 2008 U.S. Department of Defense initiative to expand 
the use of electronic payments in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The initiative, known as the 
“Cashless Battlefield,” involved shifting compensation of local suppliers and contractors 
from cash payments to “mobile banking” – a form of electronic financial transactions that 
exploits the cellular telephone network.  One reason for this was to eliminate the logistic 
burden created by so-called “jingle runs” – vulnerable large-scale shipments of cash that 
had to be escorted through hostile territory.  More important, however, was the belief that 
                                                
1 In tangentially related research, Rogoff (1998) and Drehmann et. al. (2002) evaluate the impact of violent 
crime on demand for physical cash for small samples of OECD nations.  Neither paper finds any clear or 
meaningful relationship between the two.   
2 Focusing on electronic financial transactions and crime in the United States, Wright et. al. (2014), 
consistent with our findings, reports that electronic financial transaction adoption does appear to reduce 
crime.   
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development of electronic financial transactions in Iraq and Afghanistan would 
complicate insurgent efforts to engage in robbery and extortion, thereby enhancing 
physical security.3  
The Cashless Battlefield has been followed by the “Better than Cash Alliance,” an 
initiative of the U.S. Agency for International Development that was launched in 
September 2012.  The Better than Cash Alliance’s formal goal is to “empower people by 
accelerating the shift to electronic payments.” One of the initiative’s formal objectives is 
to enhance the physical security of often defenseless people who do not enjoy adequate 
legal or police protection and are routinely robbed of the cash they carry in their wallets 
or store in their homes and businesses.4  
In his remarks at the inauguration of the Better than Cash Alliance, US Agency 
for International Development administrator Rajiv Shah outlined a variety of initiatives 
that the Agency has mounted to promote electronic financial transactions – initiatives that 
clearly illustrate the ambitious nature of the Better than Cash Alliance: 
In the Philippines, we’re working with a range of public and private 
partners to transition 100 companies to e-payroll. And I’ve personally 
offered President Aquino our support for their new commitment to 
electronic payments in government. 
In Malawi, we are supporting the efforts of the government to shift 
300,000 civil servant salaries from cash to mobile money—as well as 
transition over the nation’s largest agricultural voucher program from 
paper to mobile delivery.  
And in Afghanistan, we are delighted by the very recent news that they 
have made their own commitment to Better than Cash. We will continue 
to work closely with them to ensure more than 300,000 Afghans can pay 
their electricity bills from their phones—ultimately helping to drive more 
                                                
3 See Kunkel (2008) for a description of the Cashless Battlefield Initiative. 
4 See http://betterthancash.org/why-e-payments/  accessed 4 January 2013. 
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revenue to the utility company and expand electricity to 80 percent of 
Afghans that don’t have access today. 
Underpinning these efforts, we have also recently forged two new 
partnerships with Citi and Vodafone and Technoserve to reach a scale in 
mobile money previously unimaginable. This partnership will build on our 
work across the world, but especially in Haiti—where we helped launch a 
mobile money revolution, expanding access to more than 800,000 people.5 
 
Efforts like the Better than Cash Alliance and the Cashless Battlefield illustrate 
that US government agencies are deeply convinced of the efficacy of electronic payment 
technologies as a means to enhance physical security in poor and dangerous places.  
Surprisingly, however, very little is actually known about electronic financial 
transactions’ impact on crime. 
Until recently, much of the extensive dialogue on electronic financial transactions 
and crime has taken the form of estimates or anecdotes.  Warwick (1993), for example, 
forecasts that if the United States fully replaced the use of cash with electronic financial 
transactions “it is plausible that at least 15% and as much as 40% of crime in general 
could be prevented.”  Meanwhile, an evaluation of the M-PESA mobile banking network 
in Kenya offers the following as evidence of the efficacy of electronic financial 
transactions in reducing crime:  
 
One of our customers traveling from Nairobi to Kisumu 
deposited money with M-PESA and withdrew it at his 
destination instead of carrying cash – this is to combat the 
insecurity and theft on public transport. This behavior was 
also seen during the M-PESA pilot.6 
 
 
                                                
5 See http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/remarks-administrator-rajiv-shah-ford-foundation, 
accessed 4 January 2013. 
6 See Vaughan (2007), p. 6. 
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To be sure, there is absolutely nothing wrong with estimates and anecdotes, but it 
is probably not good practice for major government agencies to divert considerable 
financial and managerial resources into initiatives inspired by the behavior of “some guy 
who took a bus.” Clearly, a more careful analysis of the relationship between electronic 
financial transactions and crime is required.   
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on the 
effect of electronic transactions on crime. Sections 3 and 4 describe our estimation 
strategy and data.  In Section 5, we report our findings.  Our results suggest that there is a 
negative and significant statistical relationship between electronic financial transactions 
and economic crimes such as robbery and burglary. In Section 6, we consider the 
possibility that our findings are the result of a spurious relationship and that some 
unidentified variable is driving both increased point of sale device penetration while 
reducing crime.  To test for this, we evaluate the statistical relationship between 
electronic financial transactions and non-economic crimes such as homicide and rape.  
We find, reassuringly, that point of sale device proliferation has no impact on non-
economic crime.  Section 7 concludes the paper with a discussion of its implications for 
future research and development policy. 
2. Cash and Crime 
In his seminal 1968 paper, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” 
Gary Becker developed a model where rational agents choose to engage in crime if the 
expected return exceeds that legal economic activities can offer.  While such an approach 
to crime is obviously unsuitable for understanding the motivations of serial killers or 
sexual predators, there is no doubt that a good portion of crime, particularly property 
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crime such as robbery and burglary, is indeed motivated by straightforward economic 
considerations of risk and reward.  
Following Becker (1968), a very sizable literature developed that explored 
various aspects of the relationship between economics and crime.  One line of research 
sought to identify the social and economic factors that made crime economically 
attractive, and focused on the roles that poverty, social equity, education, and 
demographics play in determining the level of crime.7  
A second line of research focused on identifying policies that could reduce the 
frequency and severity of criminal activity. This literature addresses a number of issues, 
including the effectiveness of deterrence and the impact of gun control, the legalization of 
abortion, and the prohibition of drug and alcohol consumption on crime rates.8  The 
impact of electronic financial transactions adoption on crime, and hence this paper, lies 
squarely within this second line of research. 
Advocates of electronic payments as a means of enhancing physical security 
generally begin their analysis by noting that “most street crime is committed either to 
obtain cash, or with cash used as a payment medium”(Warwick, 1993).  Based on this, 
they offer two very different hypotheses for why electronic financial transactions should 
reduce the frequency and severity of criminal activity.  
The first hypothesis is based on the observation that cash is an important input 
that facilitates organized criminal activity.  In this argument, criminals value cash 
because of its anonymity and the absence of audit trails. The sums seized in raids on 
                                                
7 For a good review of this literature, see Buonanno (2003). 
8 For a good review of this literature, see Dills et. al. (2009). 
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narcotics traffickers illustrate the importance of cash in criminal enterprises.  For 
example, a 2008 raid in Mexico netted $205 million in U.S. currency.9  
Given that organized criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, are clearly cash 
intensive, it stands to reason that if cash was no longer available, criminals would have 
no choice but to adopt electronic financial transactions for their transactions.  
Dependence on electronic financial transactions would, in turn, drive up their “cost of 
doing business.”   As a result, some of the crimes they commit would no longer pay. 
The second hypothesis focuses on the role of cash in street crime.  Robbers, for 
example, do not hold up convenience stores in order to obtain snack food, but in order to 
“empty the till.”  Electronic financial payment technology allows convenience stores to 
operate with less cash in the till.  As a result, emptying the till is less attractive, and 
marginal holdups – those whose net benefits were small to begin with – may no longer be 
worthwhile to commit.  This would lead to a decline in the aggregate rate of crime.  
Similar reasoning would hold for gas stations, liquor stores, and so on. 
While both hypotheses regarding the relationship between physical cash and 
crime are entirely plausible, the first hypothesis cannot be tested empirically. Criminals 
need not shift to electronic financial transactions for their dealings as long as they can 
easily exploit cash as an alternative. The only way to force criminals into electronic 
financial transactions is to completely eliminate cash – something often referred to as a 
“cashless economy:” 
In order to dramatically reduce crime, the nation must become completely 
cashless.  A mere reduction in the nation’s cash supply, no matter how substantial, 
                                                
9 Hector Tobar and Danny Martinez. Mexico meth raid yields $205 million in U.S. cash. LA Times, 17 
March 2008. http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-meth17mar17,0,709967.story?page=1. 
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is insufficient. Even a relatively small amount of cash in circulation will sustain 
widespread crime. (Warwick, 1993) 
  
To date, no country has implemented a truly cashless economy, and hence there is no 
way to ascertain whether and to what degree the complete elimination of physical cash 
would reduce criminal activity.    
While cash must be eliminated if criminals are to be forced into using electronic 
financial transactions, small businesses and individuals can eschew cash in favor of 
electronic transactions in order to protect themselves from crimes such as robbery and 
burglary.   Hence, greater access to electronic financial transactions should 
straightforwardly lead to fewer robberies and thefts.  Given that electronic financial 
transactions access varies widely among countries and over time, this hypothesis can 
certainly be evaluated using statistical methods.  
The methodological approach of this paper places it in a small body of empirical 
literature on the cross-country determinants of crime.  The foundational work of 
Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002a, 2002b) treat crime as a dynamic process 
(using system-GMM models) and looked for robust determinants of aggregate crime 
rates.  Their results suggest that economic factors play a significant role in determining 
the incidence of crime.  Specifically they identified higher rates of inequality, GDP 
growth, and urbanization as factors that lead to high crime rates.  Using similar methods, 
Neumayer10(2003, 2005) finds that the relationship between inequality and crime is 
fragile, and argues that sweeping policy changes, in addition to modernization, influence 
crime rates over a long time horizon.  Lee and Shin (2011) reexamine the relationship 
                                                
10 Neumayer (2003) focuses on fixed effects and Neumayer (2005) uses system GMM in addition to fixed 
and random effects models.   
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between inequality and crime, focusing on the identification of better measures of 
inequality and use difference GMM and fixed-effects models to look at the impact of 
within-country variations in income inequality in 13 OECD countries.  
 
3. Estimation Strategy 
We model economic crime as a function of electronic transactions, a set of 
country level control variables and an error term: 
 
Ri,t =  β0+β2Xi,t + β3Pi,t + εi,t   Equation (1) 
 
where R is the log of the number of robberies or burglaries per capita per year, and X is a 
vector of control variables.  P is the log of the number of point of sale devices per capita, 
the familiar machines that record credit and debit card transactions, which is our proxy 
for the prevelance of electronic transactions,11 and εi,t represents idiosyncratic error.  
To account for fixed, unobserved country characteristics and common time 
shocks we extend the model to include constant country fixed effects and yearly time 
dummies: 
Ri,t =  β0+ β2Xi,t + β3Pi,t + ci + µt +εi,t Equation (2) 
 
                                                
11 Until very recently, retail electronic financial transactions were literally impossible in the absence of such 
devices.  In the past few years, it has also become possible to conduct retail electronic financial transactions 
through mobile phones or biometric smart cards, but these technologies were not widely in use during the 
period covered in our sample.  To assure that prevalence of point of sale devices does indeed correspond to 
access to electronic financial technologies, several countries that were early adopters of such technologies – 
Kenya and South Africa – have been excluded from our sample. 
 11 
where ci is a country specific error and µt controls for time related trends in or shocks on 
crime rates.12 Graph 1 and regression estimation do not suggest a clear time trend for the 
period. We test for the appropriateness of including time dummy variables by testing the 
hypothesis that all year dummy variables are jointly equal to zero.  In the case of robbery 
we accept the null, finding no significant time trend or shocks, but in the case of burglary 
we reject the null at the 1% level.  Although only required for the burglary case,   
 we follow Wooldridge’s (2001) advice and include time dummies in all of our fixed 
effects and GMM models.  
With country fixed effects, our analysis is robust to unobserved factors that affect 
both electronic payments and crime that are fixed at the country level, such as bureacratic 
red tape. This specification is also robust to dynamic shocks common across countries, 
such as global economic crises. We will overstate the relationship between electronic 
payments and crime if unobserved country-level factors associated with the spread of 
electronic payments also reduce crime. Of greatest concern here is the possibility that 
economic development could promote electronic fianncial transactions while reducing 
economic crime.13  
We use point of sale devices as a proxy for access to electronic financial 
transactions for a number of reasons.  Most importantly, changes in point of sale devices 
are not correlated with changes in GDP per capita14.  Other potential proxies such as 
changes in the number or aggregate value of card transactions or changes in the number 
of issued credit cards per capita are much more highly correlated with changes in GDP 
                                                
12 While a time trend can be included instead of the time dummy variables it unnecessarily forces the 
impact of time to be linear (Wooldridge 2001). 
13 See for example Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002a, 2002b) who find that economic growth is a 
significant detractor from economic crime.   
14 We confirm this by regressing changes in point of sale devices on changes in GDP per capita.   
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per capita as they more closely parallel changes in economic activity.  Secondly, there are 
fewer observations available for alternative proxies.  Thirdly, we reason that point of sale 
devices are a good proxy for the prevalence of electronic financial transactions because 
the devices are expensive.  Hence, it is unlikely that merchants are purchasing or renting 
them unless offering customers the option of using electronic financial transactions 
confers a meaningful competitive advantage – something that would only be true if large 
numbers of customers are actually using credit or debit cards.  
Thus we initially rely on fixed effects models because we are interested in 
understanding the variation in crime within countries that results from the proliferation of 
point of sale devices, rather than the impact of cross-country variation in access to 
electronic financial transactions.  However, we have an additional concern that crime 
levels may be highly persistent. We conducted the Wooldridge (2001) serial correlation 
test, and found that the crimes we examine in our study are strongly serially correlated 
with an ar(1) process indicating that a dynamic model is appropriate.   
It is common in the literature exploring cross-country differences in crime to use 
lagged dependent variable models to address serial correlation in crime levels 
(Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 2002a, 2002b;   Neumayer, 2005; Lee and Shin, 
2011) . Following the literature, we follow Arellano and Bond (1991) in using the 
difference GMM, which takes the difference of all variables and uses all available lags of 
endogenous variables as instruments. For the GMM, we modify equation (2) to produce:  
Ri,t =  β0+ β1Ri,t-1 +β2Xi,t + β3Pi,t + ci + µt + εi,t Equation (3) 
where β1Ri,t-1 measures the impact of the lagged robbery or burglary on its present state.  
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While we include results for OLS and FE  with lagged dependent variables as 
points of reference, OLS and FE estimators that include lagged dependent variables 
inherently suffer from endogeneity since the lagged dependent variable is systematically 
correlated with the error term.  OLS and FE estimators of the lagged dependent variables 
provide an upper and lower bound for well behaved coefficients on lagged dependent 
variables.   
In addition to our basic rationale for using fixed effects and difference GMM 
models - that they focus on the within-country variation which we are interested in 
measuring - there are several additional reasons that fixed effects and difference GMM 
are most appropriate.  Wooldridge (2001) and Roodman (2006) show that in situations 
where country-specific effects impact independent variables, random effects and system-
GMM models are inconsistent, and it seems likely that the general level of national 
development influences independent variables such as urbanization, police per capita and 
the proliferation of electronic financial transactions.  A final reason for choosing between 
system and difference GMM is stationarity, and using a Fisher test we find that crime 
rates and electronic financial transactions are all stationary in differences.  Admittedly, 
using difference GMM comes at a price – we are giving up the extra variation we could 
exploit in system-GMM models.15  
4. Data  
We use an unbalanced panel dataset of 70 countries over six years to estimate the 
impact of electronic transactions on robbery and burglary. Table 1 the shows countries 
included in our analyses and years of data available for each country. Our panel includes 
                                                
15 To be on the safe side, we also ran system GMM models, but the resultant Hansen tests did not support 
the validity of the extra moment conditions.  
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31 countries that the World Bank classifies as middle income and five countries it 
classifies as low income.  Because of data limitations, only five countries in our sample 
come from sub-Saharan Africa.     
 Our data on per capita rates of robbery and burglary come from the United 
Nations Office on Crime and Drugs.  Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the 
dependent and independent variables that we use, including overall, between, and within-
country statistics. The United Nations Office on Crime and Drugs dataset suffers from 
well-documented bias caused by differences in reporting practices among countries 
(Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 2002a). Our models control for this problem by 
focusing strictly on within-country variation using fixed effects and difference-GMM 
models.  
Data on point of sale devices per capita come from the World Bank’s 2010 report, 
Payment Systems Worldwide.16  In the GMM models we report results with this variable 
treated both as exogenous and endogenous. We include most of the common control 
variables from the literature cited above: the degree of urbanization, the unemployment 
rate, and per capita GDP measured in terms of purchasing power parity. These data are 
drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  We treat all of these 
variables as predetermined but not necessarily exogenous.  
In several models we also use police per capita.  Data for this variable are taken 
from the United Nations Office on Crime and Drugs database.  In the GMM models 
where we include it, we treat police per capita as potentially endogenous, instrumenting 
for the variable using taxes as a share of population.  This treatment follows the work of 
                                                
16 http://go.worldbank.org/5MYOUCYBR0. 
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Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) who use taxes per capita to instrument for police and Lee 
and Shin (2011) who use taxes as a share of GDP.  
Several other possible control variables, such as males as percentage of the 
population and female labor force participation, fluctuate too little within countries over 
the time period of this study to be useful, and hence are left out.  
We compare changes in GDP against changes in point of sale devices and crime 
rates to examine whether underlying economic conditions are driving simultaneous 
increases in point of sale device use and decreases in economic crime.  While we expect 
cross-country differences in devlopment to be related to both electronic financial 
transactions and crime, GDP per capita would need to be related to the first differences of 
point of sale devices and robbery or burglary to be problematic for our analysis.  Graphs 
1 and 2 illustrate that while average level of development, as measured by GDP per 
capita, drives cross-country differences in device penetration, changes in GDP per capita 
are uncorrelated with changes in point of sale device adoption.  Regression analysis 
similarly shows that first differences in GDP per capita do not significantly impact first 
differences in point of sale device penetration.  There is, unsurprisingly, a significant and 
positive time trend in point of sale device use over the period; this trend persists despite 
changing underlying economic conditions17 
Graphs 3 and 4 show the underlying relationship between robbery and burglary 
and GDP per capita.  Preliminary analysis suggests that wealthier countries have less of 
both and that changes in GDP per capita might reduce burglary but have no significant 
effect on robbery.  We include GDP per capita in our models to control for this issue, but 
                                                
17 This is what makes point of sale devices a better variable than transactions– once vendors get one they 
do not give them up during economic downturns. 
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we are less concerned that changing economic conditions are driving our results because 
of their lack of effect on point of sale device proliferation and robbery.   
5. Results 
In Tables 3 through 5, we model the relationship of point of sale device 
penetration to robbery and burglary.  In the preponderance of models, increased point of 
sale device penetration has a significant negative impact on these economic crimes.   
Table 3 presents our fixed-effects models of robbery and burglary. We present 
models with and without controls.  In the models of robbery, point of sale devices are 
negative and significant at the 10% and 5% levels in models (1) and (2). An increase of 1 
device per 1000 people is associated with between 3% to 4% drop in the robbery rate. In 
the burglary models, point of sale devices are significant at the 10% level in model (4) 
with control variables and insignificant in model (3) without controls. Here an increase of 
1 device per 1000 people increase is associated with a 3% reduction in burglary.  
Referring back to Table 2, within our sample, there are an average nine point of sale 
devices per 1000 people, though the number ranges from 0 to 60.   Within countries, a 
standard deviation is a change of about two devices per 1000 people, therefore a one 
within-country standard deviation change would account for a 6% to an 8% reduction in 
robbery or a 6% reduction in burglary.    
Table 4 shows dynamic models of robbery which imply a similar result: a 1 
device per 1000 people increase in point of sale devices leads to a 2.2% to 5.6% 
reduction in robbery .  Model (5), an OLS model, and model (6), a fixed effects model, 
give the approximate upper and lower bounds for the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable needed to evaluate the performance of the GMM models.  Models (7)-(10)use a 
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difference-GMM methodology.  Following Roodman (2008), who cautions that 
instrument proliferation can overfit endogenous variables and weaken Hansen tests in 
GMM models, we limit model (8) to the first 3 lags of the instruments for the lagged 
dependent variable18.  In model (9) we instrument for the first difference of point of sale 
devices with second and deeper lagged levels to control for potential point of sale device 
endogeneity, despite consistent findings of no endogeneity when point of sale devices are 
singled out in difference-in-Hansen tests.  In model (10) we add police per capita as an 
explanatory variable.   
In models (7) through (9), the effect of lagged point of sale devices is negative 
and significant at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels of confidence. In model (10), point of 
sale devices are not significant.  Arguably, the change in the lagged dependent variable 
coefficient to outside the bounds the OLS and fixed effects models set and the 
insignificance of police per capita indicate that this specification is less preferable than 
those that omit police per capita.  In models (7) and (9), the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable falls within the bounds the OLS and fixed effects models set, making 
these our preferable specifications.  In these specifications, a one standard deviation 
change in point of sale device use would drive a 4.6% to an 11.2% reduction in crime.   
In Table 5, we substitute burglary for robbery as the dependent variable in our 
dynamic specifications and report similar results from the same six specifications.  In 
model (13), the negative impact of point of sale devices is significant at the 99% level, 
                                                
18 High instrument counts, per Roodman (2006, 2008) bias Hansen tests (for instrument validity) and 
difference-in-Hansen tests (for endogeneity).  While rejecting the null in a Hansen test indicates valid 
instruments, a Hansen test with p-values of over 0.25 may indicate excessive instrument proliferation, and 
in such cases one may fail to reject null hypotheses that should be rejected in Hansen and difference-in-
Hansen tests.  Therefore, we run our difference-in-Hansen tests on models where the instruments are 
restricted to two lags of the endogenous variables.    We primarily include unconstrained models here 
because their instrument counts are lower than n, a crude rule of thumb.  
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and in the remaining dynamic models, including the specification that incorporates police 
per capita, it is significant at the 95% level of confidence.   All models, except model (16) 
with police per capita included, are well behaved with their coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable falling between the OLS and fixed effects coefficients.  
At the high end, the impact of point of sale device proliferation is slightly smaller 
in the burglary than in the robbery models, with the estimated impact of an increase of 1 
point of sale device per 1000 people resulting in a 2.2% to 4.4% reduction in burglary. 
Along these lines a one standard deviation increase in point of sale devices would result 
in 4.4% to 8.8% reduction in crime.   
The lack of consistent results for control variables should not be regarded as 
surprising.  Recent reviews of the empirical literature on crime, such as Buonanno (2003) 
and Dills et. al. (2009), find that few of the variables regarded as important in this 
literature have proven to have a consistent or robust relationship with changes in the level 
of crime.  Dills et. al. (2009) concludes that “economists know little about the main 
factors identified in the economics of crime literature as key determinants of crime.   
Even hypotheses that find some support in U.S. data for recent decades are inconsistent 
with data over longer horizons or across countries.” Along these lines, results for Police 
per capita are negative and insignificant.19  This is similar to Lee and Shin (2011) who 
find that although police per capita are a significant determinant of crime rates across 
states in the US, they are insignificant across countries.  
 
6. Robustness 
                                                
19 The impact is insignificant both when included explicitly and when instrumented with taxes as a share of 
population. 
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We consider two outstanding issues that might give rise to concern about the 
robustness of our conclusions.  First we consider the issue of spurious correlation and the 
possiblity that some other mechanism is both driving point of sale device proliferation 
and reducing crime.  Second we look at whether the results hold across countries at 
different levels of development, an attempt to rule out the issue that electronic financial 
transactions adoption and crime reduction are conditioned on initial levels of GDP. While 
we cannot rule out either issue in its entirety, these tests give credence to the idea that the 
proliferation of point of sale devices is driving down crime.  
To rule out the possibility of spurious correlation, we explore the possibility that 
some other mechanism promotes point of sale device proliferation while discouraging 
crime in general. If electronic financial transactions are promoted because of high crime 
rates they may be simply acting as a proxy for other crime-fighting measures, and we 
would expect that these other measures are likely to reduce non-financial crime. If, on the 
other hand, point of sale devices are discouraging criminals because stores and 
individuals have less cash on hand, their proliferation should have little or no impact on 
rates of murder and rape.  To examine this hypothesis, we substitute murder and rape for 
robbery and burglary as dependent variables. Data on per capita rates of murder and rape 
are taken from the UNOCD database.   
In Table 6, we report the results of difference-GMM models for murder and rape. 
We reassuringly find no significant relationships between access to point of sale devices 
and murder or rape. In the case of one of the murder models, and two of the rape models, 
the estimated coefficient on point of sale devices is not only insignificant but positive.  
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Turning to the second issue, our initial modelling efforts took into account the 
basic issues that GDP per capita might be related both to crime rates and electronic 
financial transactions proliferation. Fixed effects and difference models largely eliminate 
the issue because changes in GDP are uncorrelated with changes in robbery and burglary.   
We also chose point of sale device proliferation as our proxy for electronic financial 
transactions as changes in point of sale device use is unrelated to changes in GDP.  
Still, one might be concerned that the initial level of GDP per capita could shape 
both changes in crime rates and changes in point of sale device proliferation.  The rates of 
diffusion of technology may be different depending on economic conditions ( e.g. Andres 
et al., 2010) We test for this, regressing the first differences of robbery, burglary, and 
point of sale devices on the initial level of GDP per capita.  Our results suggest that while 
changes in robbery are not shaped by initial levels of GDP per capita, changes in point of 
sale device proliferation and burglary are.  Specifically this means that the conditioning 
effect should be a non-issue in the robbery models but there could be a potential bias in 
burglary models.  
This conditioning is implicitly controlled for using fixed effects and difference 
GMM.  Still, to test whether somehow our result stems from trends set in motion by 
initial levels of development we compare Fixed Effects models across income groups.20 
Although somewhat rudimentary, the analysis in Table 7 suggests that although the 
impact of point of sale devices is larger for low income countries, these conditions are not 
driving the relationship.     
7. Conclusion 
 
                                                
20 Adding control variables and using GMM models require additional degrees of freedom that are 
unavailable when we limit the samples.   
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As a whole we interpret our results as meaningful evidence that there is a 
negative, significant, and robust relationship between greater access to electronic 
financial transactions and lower incidence of economic crime, and that the lessened 
vulnerability that electronic financial transactions offer drives this relationship. 
Going forward, new technologies assure that access to electronic financial 
transactions will accelerate.  It is quite easy to enable fourth generation “smart phones” to 
effectively function as both a credit/debit card and a point of sale device.  Every 
individual with an iPhone or Blackberry can conduct electronic transactions with any 
other similarly equipped individual.  As Kenya’s M-PESA mobile banking system has 
demonstrated, even relatively unsophisticated mobile phones can provide a means of 
payment, albeit less elegantly.  
In China, electronic financial transactions are proliferating in remote rural areas 
through a novel system that converts regular land-line phones into hybrid “transfer 
telephones.”  In describing the advantage of using such phones as a means of paying 
farmers for deliveries of chili peppers, a processor explained that “it’s faster and more 
convenient for customers and it promotes public safety.  You’re not at risk of being 
stabbed for your money.”21 
There are even technologies that make it possible to conduct electronic 
transactions in remote regions where there is no connectivity to the Internet or to mobile 
phone service.  The South African Social Security Administration, for example, currently 
distributes millions of social grants using a system that relies on biometrics and smart 
cards coupled with point of sale devices, making it feasible to engage in electronic 
payments literally in the middle of nowhere.  
                                                
21 Dinny McMahon, A Way to Pay in Rural China, Wall Street Journal, 10 January 2013, p. B5 
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The nascent global boom in electronic financial transactions access could prove to 
be a transformative event in less developed countries and poorer communities.  These are 
the places where “cash crimes,” such as muggings and holdups, are most ubiquitous - 
often so common that it becomes impossible to conduct even the most mundane forms of 
commerce.  The results reported in this paper suggest that widespread access to electronic 
financial transactions has the potential to greatly enhance personal security in these areas. 
New technologies could enable far more widespread access.  This, in turn, could unleash 
a great deal of industry and commerce, resulting in a significant improvement in 
standards of living.  As such, we conclude that the evidence so far suggests that it makes 
sense for aid agencies and development institutions to promote electronic financial 
transactions through initiatives like US Agency for International Development’s Better 
Than Cash Alliance. 
 23 
Table 1 : Countries and Years 
 
Country Country
Albania 2005 2008 Latvia 2004 2009
Armenia 2004 2009 Lebanon 2005 2006
Australia 2004 2009 Lithuania 2004 2009
Austria 2004 2009 Luxembourg 2006 2008
Azerbaijan 2004 2009 Macedonia 2005 2006
Belgium 2004 2009 Malaysia 2005 2006
Belize 2006 2009 Malta 2004 2009
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005 2009 Mexico 2004 2009
Botswana 2004 2009 Mongolia 2008 2009
Bulgaria 2004 2009 Montenegro 2006 2008
Canada 2004 2009 Morocco 2005 2008
Colombia 2004 2009 Mozambique 2006 2008-2009
Croatia 2006 2009 Nepal 2005 2006
Cyprus 2004 2009 Netherlands 2004 2006
Czech Republic 2004 2009 New Zealand 2005 2008
Denmark 2005 2009 Norway 2004 2009
Dominican Republic 2005 2006 Oman 2007 2008
Egypt 2004 2009 Poland 2004 2009
El Salvador 2005 2006 Portugal 2004 2009
Estonia 2004 2009 Romania 2004 2009
Finland 2004 2009 Russia 2004 2009
France 2004 2009 Serbia 2005 2009
Georgia 2008 2009 Singapore 2004 2006
Germany 2004 2009 Slovakia 2004 2009
Greece 2004 2009 Slovenia 2004 2009
Hong Kong 2007 2009 Spain 2005 2009
Hungary 2004 2009 Sudan 2007 2008
India 2006 2009 Sweden 2004 2009
Ireland 2004 2009 Switzerland 2004 2009
Italy 2004 2009 Thailand 2005 2009
Jamaica 2004 2009 Trinidad and Tobago 2004 2009
Japan 2004 2009 Turkey 2004 2008
Kazakhstan 2005 2008 Uganda 2004 2007-2008
Kuwait 2004 2009 Ukraine 2004 2009





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
overall 3.631945 1.63398 -2.407946 7.654221 N =     584
between 1.691669 -2.07413 7.554314 groups = 117
within 0.3515927 1.565017 6.39022
overall 4.908229 1.98967 -3.218876 7.570051 N =     490
between 2.081503 -2.872302 7.383869 groups =  101
within 0.4554818 1.509209 7.800147
overall 1.511035 1.326609 -4.60517 4.261242 N =     752
between 1.407134 -4.60517 4.107786 groups =  192
within 0.2110187 0.2435763 3.23662
overall 1.579861 1.337374 -4.60517 5.775948 N =     566
between 1.390324 -2.71408 5.775948 groups = 116
within 0.3873802 -2.916087 4.134902
overall !"#$%##% &"'!&!&% #"$ (!"% )*+*****%#%
between %",--,$$ - (("!'$%, ./0123*+**-(,
within -"%%4#(( 5,"#(,!!4 -&"!#%#-
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between -",!$,(, $"&4,&$ --"-'-%( ./0123*+***-'4
within #"#!,&!'! '"#,-,#- !"--$##4
 Police per Capita overall #"###%$$4 #"##(-($ -"#465#% #"#(-$'$ )*+*****(($
between #"##(&(& -"#$65#% #"#(-(! ./0123*+***!'
within #"####$$$ #"###,%$( #"##--('
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Capita
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Graph 5: and GDP per capita 
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Table 3: Robbery and Burglary Fixed Effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Robbery Robbery Burglary Burglary 
L. Point of Sale Devices per 1000 -0.0298* -0.0403** -0.00563 -0.0306* 
  (0.0172) (0.0155) (0.0188) (0.0153) 
L. Unemployment  -0.00188  -0.0552 
  (0.0265)  (0.0388) 
L. Log GDP per capita  -0.486  -2.926 
  (0.798)  (1.963) 
L. Urban Population Share  0.138  0.277** 
  (0.0855)  (0.111) 
L. Police per capita  -834.2  -1319.1 
  (1270.1)  (918.0) 
N 259 183 215 155 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 4: Dynamic Models Robbery 
 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 











L. Log Robbery 0.964*** 0.483*** 0.512*** 0.458*** 0.490*** 0.189 
 (0.0194) (0.103) (0.165) (0.169) (0.158) (0.428) 
L. Point of Sale Devices per 1000 0.00251 -0.0277** -0.0217* -0.0243** -0.0555*** -0.0327 
 (0.00427) (0.0131) (0.0121) (0.0109) (0.0150) (0.0261) 
L. Unemployment 0.00791 -0.0133 0.0112 -0.00137 -0.00557 0.00885 
 (0.00573) (0.0188) (0.0318) (0.0268) (0.0228) (0.0483) 
L. Log GDP per capita -0.0450 0.408 0.422 0.618 0.0846 -0.430 
 (0.0575) (0.464) (0.546) (0.483) (0.589) (1.403) 
L. Urban Population Share 0.00207 0.110 0.0596 0.0991 0.112 0.101 
 (0.00202) (0.0824) (0.0948) (0.0999) (0.0838) (0.0620) 
L. Police per capita      -4085.0 
      (19633.9) 
N 219 219 166 166 166 126 
Instruments   23.000 20.000 31.000 32.000 
Hansen Test   23.927 18.470 20.774 27.667 
    p>z   0.047 0.071 0.535 0.187 
Ar(1)   -1.152 -1.026 -1.141 -1.690 
    p>z   0.249 0.305 0.254 0.091 
Ar(2)   1.412 1.466 1.407 -0.324 
    p>z   0.158 0.143 0.159 0.746 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 5: Dynamic Models Burglary 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 






point of sale 
Endog 
GMM    
point of sale 
Endog 
L. Log Burglary 0.980*** 0.195 0.474*** 0.429*** 0.268* 0.180 
 (0.0218) (0.143) (0.140) (0.152) (0.146) (0.188) 
L. Point of Sale Devices per 1000 -0.00222 -0.0236* -0.0221*** -0.0200** -0.0365** -0.0440** 
 (0.00371) (0.0122) (0.00791) (0.00771) (0.0158) (0.0209) 
L. Unemployment 0.0109** -0.0364 -0.0237 -0.0225 -0.0364 -0.0260 
 (0.00529) (0.0304) (0.0189) (0.0287) (0.0284) (0.0308) 
L. Log GDP per capita 0.155** -1.209 -0.272 -0.439 -0.987* -0.881 
 (0.0632) (0.798) (0.442) (0.575) (0.523) (0.552) 
L. Urban Population Share -0.000218 0.187** 0.134** 0.124* 0.164* 0.246*** 
 (0.00176) (0.0875) (0.0651) (0.0634) (0.0843) (0.0857) 
L. Police per capita      -715.8 
      (2020.3) 
N 185 185 140 140 140 105 
Instruments   22.000 19.000 31.000 32.000 
Hansen Test   12.406 10.219 17.453 15.370 
    p>z   0.495 0.422 0.738 0.846 
Ar(1)   -1.123 -1.095 -1.080 -1.034 
    p>z   0.261 0.274 0.280 0.301 
Ar(2)   -1.375 -1.331 -1.211 -1.395 
    p>z   0.169 0.183 0.226 0.163 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 6: Murder and Rape 










GMM    
point of sale 
Endog 
Rape    
GMM 
All lags  
Rape   
GMM 
point of sale 
Endog 
Rape   
GMM    
point of sale 
Endog 
L. Log Murder -0.0669 -0.0799 -0.145    
 (0.162) (0.155) (0.210)    
L.  Log Rape    -0.0738 -0.0297 -0.547** 
    (0.336) (0.337) (0.238) 
L. Point of Sale Devices per 1000 -0.0104 -0.0102 0.0338 0.00476 -0.0226 0.00707 
 (0.00685) (0.0309) (0.0242) (0.0118) (0.0295) (0.0139) 
L. Unemployment -0.0170 -0.0187 -0.00553 0.0148 0.0161 0.00973 
 (0.0109) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0134) (0.0160) (0.0338) 
L. Log GDP per capita -1.596*** -1.331*** -0.540 -0.865* -0.958 -1.299 
 (0.388) (0.398) (0.376) (0.497) (0.661) (1.230) 
L. Urban Population Share 0.117** 0.109 0.0271 -0.0558 -0.0258 -0.109 
 (0.0515) (0.0774) (0.0871) (0.0859) (0.0990) (0.0840) 
L. Police per capita   7905.4   1976.8 
   (6410.7)   (4318.7) 
N 185 185 125 159 159 121 
Instruments 22.000 31.000 32.000 22.000 31.000 23.000 
Hansen Test 10.512 24.555 23.825 13.489 22.645 8.211 
    p>z 0.652 0.319 0.356 0.411 0.422 0.830 
Ar(1) -1.537 -1.540 -1.362 -0.741 -0.946 0.608 
    p>z 0.124 0.124 0.173 0.459 0.344 0.543 
Ar(2) 0.412 0.404 -0.685 1.207 0.913 0.534 
    p>z 0.680 0.686 0.494 0.228 0.361 0.594 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7: Fixed Effects 
across Income Groups 
 (23) (24) (25) (26) 







L. Point of Sale Devices per 1000 -0.990*** -9.413*** -0.0287* -0.0285** 
 (0.199) (0.313) (0.0165) (0.0129) 
     
N 14 14 151 133 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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